By Tim Jones

On 8 July 2020, the Civil Justice Council (“CJC”) completed a report (“the report”) (published on 8 October 2020) reflecting on the effectiveness of the civil injunction regime under Part 1 of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (“the 2014 Act”). The report can be found here. The purpose of this article is to summarise and comment on the key points of the report, which highlighted a number of areas where the new civil injunction regime under the 2014 Act did not appear to be working as intended.

Background

First, a little on the pre-2014 Act landscape. “Anti-social behaviour” (“ASB”) is defined in Section 2 of the 2014 Act as conduct that has caused, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to a person; conduct capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to a person in relation to their occupation of premises; or conduct capable of causing housing-related nuisance or annoyance to any person.1 Categories of ASB range from the minor to the serious, including littering, dog mess, verbal abuse, rough sleeping in communal stairwells of housing blocks, prostitution, noise nuisance, vandalism, violence and drug activity.

Prior to the 2014 Act, various different powers were available to the police, local authorities and registered social landlords (as they were then known) in order to tackle ASB. That regime was different from the current one in many respects. However, the salient points are as follows:

• The police and local authorities could apply for the infamous Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (“ASBOs”) under Section 1 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Although these were technically civil, applications had to be made to the Magistrates’ Court, and a criminal standard of proof had to be met.2 Breach of an ASBO was a criminal offence.3
• Local authorities, housing action trusts and registered social landlords could apply for injunctions in the County Court under Sections 153A-E of the Housing Act 1996, as inserted by the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003. Such injunctions could be applied for without notice provided it was exceptionally urgent to do so,4 and came in the following varieties:- Anti-social behaviour injunctions;
  – Injunctions against unlawful use of premises; or
  – Injunctions against breaches (or anticipated breaches) of tenancy agreements.
• Landlords of any description could issue possession proceedings based on tenancy breaches, ASB or deterioration of the condition of the property.5 The grant of a possession order on these grounds was discretionary, based on whether the court considered it reasonable to make a possession order,6 and any possession order could be suspended upon terms.7

It should be noted that ASBOs and Housing Act 1996 injunctions were purely prohibitive in scope; that is to say, they could prohibit respondents from committing certain acts, but they could not compel them to do anything. The problem with this approach was that it inhibited the court’s ability to address the root causes of ASB; for example, if a respondent’s ASB consisted of cannabis use due to an addiction, the court had no power to require them to participate in a rehabilitation programme that might have helped them to recover from their addiction and thus prevent them from committing this type of ASB in the future. It could only prohibit them from using cannabis, which might be an unrealistic goal for someone with an untreated addiction, and this would simply set them up for further encounters with the court system down the line when they breached the ASBO or injunction.

Eventually, the government formed a view that the range of tools available to tackle ASB was insufficiently victim-focused; that possession proceedings for ASB were unduly protracted due to the court’s discretion over whether to grant (or suspend) a possession order; and that ASBOs were not effective at reducing ASB. Indeed, 58% of ASBOs issued between 1 June 2000 and 31 December 2013 had been breached at least once, and, of those breached, 75% had been breached more than once (on average, five times).8 This perceived failure was attributed to a lack of intervention to address the causes of ASB as opposed to merely prohibiting it and punishing those who committed it.

2014 reforms

Enter the 2014 Act. The salient points of the reforms introduced in 2014 were as follows:

• ASBOs and Housing Act 1996 injunctions were abolished and replaced by the more streamlined regime of civil injunctions under Section 1 of the 2014 Act. Such injunctions:- Would be granted if the court was satisfied that the respondent had committed ASB and that it was just and convenient to do so;9– Were applied for in the County Court,10 unless at least one of the Respondents was under 18, in which case they were applied for in the Youth Court;11– Could be applied for by the police, local authorities or Registered Providers of Social Housing (“RPs”), among other bodies;12– Only required a civil standard of proof – namely, on the balance of probabilities – unlike ASBOs;13– Could be made subject to special measures directions for vulnerable witnesses under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999; 14 and- Could now impose positive requirements upon Respondents, such as a requirement to participate in drug and/or alcohol rehabilitation programmes.15 This was designed to address the problem of ASBOs and Housing Act 1996 injunctions – which, as stated, were purely prohibitive – failing to deal with what were perceived to be the root causes of ASB. However, a third party would have to be willing to agree to supervise compliance.
• There was a new mandatory ground for possession – i.e. one which obliged a court to grant a possession order without the possibility of suspension – which was triggered if, among other things, the defendant had been found in committal proceedings to have breached a civil injunction.16 This was designed to obviate the need for protracted possession proceedings in circumstances where the Respondent had breached a previous order by the court not to commit ASB.

Commentary

The author’s view of the positive requirement element of the civil injunction regime is that it is largely academic and fails to achieve its aims. It was passed with the best of intentions, but insufficient attention had been given to the nuts and bolts of how positive requirements were to operate in practice. The 2014 Act does not define what it means to “supervise” compliance with an injunction (is the supervisor expected to physically drag the respondent to a rehabilitation course against their will?), provides no incentive for a third party to volunteer to be a supervisor, does not specify who can or should be a supervisor, and provides no mechanism for enforcing supervision. The practical upshot is that it is extremely difficult to persuade anyone to act as a supervisor, much less implement a supervision regime afterwards, with the result that civil injunctions end up being purely prohibitive in almost all cases.

Additionally, it should be borne in mind that sentencing the respondent for breaching an injunction is usually of little value to the applicant, unless that sentence is very lengthy, in which case it could be argued that it at least provides the applicant and the victims with a period of respite. The author’s experience is that most of the time, the only practical benefit to an applicant is that a breach engages the mandatory ground for possession.

Further, as injunction applications are not defended as frequently as possession claims, the first time any mental health issues that contribute to the ASB are addressed is usually when the ensuing possession claim is defended on the basis of disability discrimination under the Equality Act 2010, long after the injunction was made and subsequently breached. In such circumstances, courts will almost always set directions for trial, to include provision for expert evidence from a psychiatrist and questions to be put to the psychiatrist, rather than dealing with the defence at the initial possession hearing.17 One therefore wonders how much less “protracted” possession proceedings have become, and whether the picture would look somewhat different if defendants’ mental health was regularly being addressed at injunction stage via functional positive requirements.

As it stands, it is this author’s view that civil injunctions are, in practice, no less prohibitive, and no better at addressing the root causes of ASB, than the ASBOs and Housing Act 1996 injunctions they were designed to replace.

The Civil Justice Council’s review

In April 2018, the Civil Justice Council (“CJC”) formed a working party consisting of leading representatives of the judiciary, legal services, support services, academia, Resolve (namely, Rebecca Bryant OBE) and the CJC itself to review the effectiveness of the civil injunction regime.

The working party expressed concern about how civil injunctions were operating in practice. In particular:

• Little use had been made of positive requirements in injunctions, and as such, breaches remained high. This was often because of a lack of access to support agencies and due to the stipulation that such requirements be supervised by a third party who may or may not be willing to volunteer.18
• Sentencing for injunction breaches was inconsistent across England and Wales and, in the working party’s view, often draconian.19 This was partly due to the following reasons:- Civil courts could not pass community sentences like the criminal courts and could only impose fines (which respondents seldom had the resources to pay in any event) or custodial sentences,20 the latter of which could not be imposed in cases where a fine would otherwise be the appropriate penalty merely because the respondent could not pay the fine.21 The working party acknowledged that the court had discretion to suspend a custodial sentence upon terms, and recognised that the County Court was sometimes making creative use of such terms to achieve similar ends to community sentences. However, they also observed that the custody threshold would have to be reached in the first place in order for even a suspended sentence to be made, and that passing a suspended sentence simply because it was better than no order was not, therefore, an appropriate exercise of the court’s discretion.22– Civil courts did not have access to the Probation Service23 or the NHS Liaison and Diversion Service24 (“NHS L&D”), meaning that they were denied two useful sources of assistance in working with vulnerable respondents.- While County Courts were expected to apply the old ASBO sentencing guidelines,25 the working party noted that they were clearly not intended to apply to civil injunction breaches as the higher sentencing bracket significantly outstripped the maximum length of a custodial sentence that the County Court could impose (two years) and they referred to community orders that (as discussed) County Courts had no power to implement. This meant that the ASBO sentencing guidelines were of limited assistance to the County Court.26 Additionally, this author notes that, unlike ASBOs, civil injunctions can be made in respect of “lower level” ASB that causes “nuisance and annoyance” but does not meet the threshold of “harassment, alarm and distress”, and the ASBO sentencing guidelines make no mention of nuisance and/or annoyance whatsoever.
• Respondents often lacked representation, and the consequences of breaching injunctions were not always explained to them with sufficient clarity. Indeed, injunctions were often applied for on a “without notice” basis, meaning that the first time the respondents appeared before the court was often in committal proceedings for breach of an interim injunction.27 There were also many parts of the country, described as “advice deserts”, in which respondents struggled to obtain publicly funded representation.28
• Applicants were making frequent use of the without notice procedure merely because of delays in obtaining hearing dates for on-notice applications, which the County Court was frequently obliging. The problems with this approach resulted in the court imposing prohibitions on respondents without being able to form a view as to whether they had the requisite capacity to comply with an injunction or understand its terms.29
• The procedural requirement for robes to be worn in committal proceedings sometimes caused delays as counsel did not always have robes available at short notice.30
• There was often a lack of cooperation and information sharing between different agencies, such as housing providers and the police.31

The CJC’s recommendations

The CJC made 15 recommendations for reform, the most noteworthy of which (in the author’s opinion) are set out below:

• Local plans should be prepared for each designated area of England and Wales. Such plans are principally concerned with making positive requirements more attractive and viable and encouraging partnership working prior to making applications, but also address the administration of justice in circumstances when respondents are arrested out of hours. The plans should:- Identify the relevant local agencies and bodies engaged in the risk assessment and prevention of ASB and also the provision of assistance, support and treatment to those believed to be engaging in ASB;- Address how those agencies and bodies are to liaise before any application for a civil injunction is issued;- Be prepared with involvement from key local stakeholders, including housing providers, healthcare providers, support services, the Probation Service, the Designated Civil Judge for the region and the police;- Set out procedures for liaison between the different agencies, including data sharing, the willingness of various agencies to supervise positive requirements, and which court was nominated to deal with arrests out of hours; and- Be made available publicly and periodically reviewed.
• Public Health England should review the availability of treatment options for drug and alcohol addiction and mental health issues and give national guidance as to which are suitable for positive requirements. They should also liaise with the Home Office to establish a national network for people managing positive requirements in orders so that data and best practice can be shared.
• The Home Office, Ministry of Justice, Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service (“HMCTS”) and NHS L&D should meet as a matter of urgency to consider how the NHS L&D service should liaise and work with local agencies and how the civil courts can work with them.
• The Home Office, Ministry of Justice and Civil Procedure Rules Committee should liaise in relation to a national pre-action protocol (“PAP”) and consider the draft PAP contained within the CJC’s report. Such a PAP should require that the local plan has been adhered to.
• There should be more information for respondents about the availability of legal aid, and Judges should be required to raise this with respondents.
• Courts should ensure changes to listing procedures to guarantee an early hearing of civil injunction applications and avoid improper use of the without notice procedure. Applications should be listed as a matter of urgency and, in any event, within 14 days of the application being filed. A return date after a without notice order has been made should not be more than ten days after the initial hearing. This recommendation is aimed at protecting respondents from without notice injunctions in circumstances where they are not appropriate, but also solving the problem of delays with on-notice applications so that applicants are not incentivised to make inappropriate without notice applications in the first place.
• The functioning of the without notice procedure should be addressed as follows:- It should be curtailed and limited to circumstances where it is justified. This should be addressed in the PAP, and the reasons for making any such application should be fully set out in a witness statement. 7- All applicants should consider the issue of special measures for all witnesses relied on in support of the application and (if appropriate) ensure that it is addressed in those witness’ statements. Additionally, the court should consider whether special measures would be appropriate of its own motion even if parties do not raise it.- Judges should ask housing officers presenting applications about the nature and extent of their experience and training under the 2014 Act and, if concerned about their ability to properly present the case, require different representation; consider the respondent’s ties and support mechanisms when considering granting a geographical restriction as part of the order; give a clear warning about the risk of a possession order if the injunction is breached; word any positive requirements clearly so that they can be easily understood by all those involved; specify the frequency, expected level and means of reporting from the relevant supervising agency to the court; consider setting review dates when imposing positive requirements; and, when imposing a custodial sentence for contempt, explain the effect of the penalty, the right to apply to purge contempt, that permission to appeal is not needed and the time limit for (and route of) appeal.
• There should be updated guidance on penalties for contempt, and draft guidance is annexed the report.
• Housing officers and other representatives should receive training on vulnerability and all aspects of the making of an application under the 2014 Act. Judges should receive mandatory training on civil injunction applications and committal proceedings under the 2014 Act.

Draft PAP

The report contains, as mentioned earlier, a draft PAP, which is a set of rules and principles to be applied by applicants (and, to a lesser extent, respondents) prior to the issue of a civil injunction application. It is designed to encourage more pre-action contact, enable parties to avoid litigation and enable court time to be used more effectively. It provides that courts should take it into account when considering whether to make an order and the terms of that order. The draft PAP imposes requirements on applicants to, among other things, address mental health issues at an early stage, liaise with support services, and consider alternatives to injunctive relief and explain any decision not to use those alternatives in a witness statement. Applicants who unreasonably fail to comply with the terms of the PAP may be faced with costs sanctions or even the adjournment, striking out or dismissal of their claim, though, conversely, respondents who fail to comply will have that failure taken into account by the court when deciding whether to grant an injunction and what any terms of the injunction should be.

Draft sentencing guidance

The draft sentencing guidance makes it clear that the court has no power to impose a community sentence, that custody must be reserved as a punishment for the most serious offences, and that a suspended sentence should only be imposed if the custody threshold is reached. It also provides, among other things, for courts to adopt the following stepped approach when arriving at an appropriate penalty for contempt of court:

1. Determine the seriousness of the breach(es). Three categories of breaches are set out: 8
   a. High culpability; very serious breach or persistent breaches (such as those where there is the use of violence or threat of serious violence, a significant degree of premeditation and/or intention to engage in more serious behaviour than actually achieved).
   b. A deliberate breach falling between (a) and (c).
   c. Lower culpability; minor breaches (such as those where there is no intention to cause harm or distress and no harm or distress is reasonably foreseeable from the breach, the breach is incidental to some other lawful activity or there is a lack of premeditation or an inadvertent breach).
2. Identify the starting point and category range for the breach, based on a table contained within the guidance.
3. Make a reduction to reflect any admission of the breach(es), taking into account the Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea: Definitive Guideline.
4. Apply the totality principle; namely, when imposing a penalty in respect of a number of breaches, ensure that the total penalty reflects all of the offending behaviour and that it is just and proportionate.
5. Consider whether any order for committal should be suspended.
6. Take into account any time spent in custody or on remand.
7. Give reasons for, and explain the effect of, the penalty imposed.
8. Consider, if a positive requirement has been imposed through variation of the injunction, a review hearing to assess progress and compliance.

Discussion

The CJC’s recommendations are aimed at resolving perceived practical difficulties with the current injunction regime for applicants, respondents, courts and partnership agencies alike in terms of access to justice, vulnerability of respondents and witnesses, the use of support services both before and after injunction applications are issued, and consistent and appropriate sentencing. The CJC proposes to resolve those issues through the use of codified guidance for housing practitioners, legal professionals and respondents alike that covers areas perceived to be left grey by the 2014 Act and the Civil Procedure Rules in their current forms.

Steps in the right direction

This author particularly welcomes the report’s focus on establishing a clearer framework for actually making positive requirements work, as these have seemed like a missed opportunity. While the proposed reforms do not set out a regime for governing supervision of positive requirements, they would, if implemented, provided insight as to the true scale and nature of support that is available and the willingness and resources of agencies to provide supervision. This would be a step forward in enabling civil injunctions to address the shortcomings of the ASBO and Housing Act 1996 regimes.

The suggestion of a PAP is a positive move as questions regarding actions taken prior to issuing injunction applications typically arise in the hearing of such applications anyway, and this 9 would assist would-be applicants in ensuring that they take the appropriate pre-action steps, only issue when it is appropriate to do so and use court time and resources more effectively. This author also welcomes the proposal that District Judges undergo compulsory training on civil injunctions. For example:

• In this author’s experience, judicial attitudes to what constitutes exceptional urgency for the purposes of a without notice application vary widely. In some cases, a gap of one or two days in between the most recent incident and the hearing of the application is enough for a judge to decide that the matter is not sufficiently urgent to justify making an order without notice – even if the reason for that gap is clearly explained, such as because the applicant was awaiting a police report. This often presents a difficult dilemma for applicants as they may feel pressured into “shooting first and asking questions later” lest their without notice applications fail for a perceived want of urgency.
• RPs who apply for civil injunctions need to be able to demonstrate that the ASB complained of is of a sort that directly or indirectly affects their housing management functions.32 This is due to their aforementioned lack of democratic accountability and narrower remit when compared to the police and local authorities. However, the Court of Appeal found, in 2009, that the phrase “housing management function” should be construed widely and that, in particular, the availability of another remedy does not take the ASB complained of outside of that category;33 indeed, it is difficult to conceive of ASB that would be serious enough to warrant making a civil injunction application but would not overlap with some other area of law, such as criminal law or the tort of nuisance. Nonetheless, this author has found that judges sometimes find that an applicant’s housing management function is not engaged because, in their view, the police and criminal courts should be dealing with the matter or that the complainant should obtain an injunction of their own under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (or, if the ASB consists of domestic violence, a non-molestation order). While this stance can obviously be countered by citing the aforementioned case law, the impact of this counter is more limited in the context of a without notice application, in which case the time involved in appealing the decision renders the point academic. This author would recommend that the PAP address this issue, perhaps by providing a nonexhaustive list of acts that engage housing management functions.

Further issues

That being said, question marks remain. For instance:

• Civil courts are now in the position of having to deal with behaviours which, in many cases, overlap with criminal law. Similarly, local authorities and RPs are arguably thrust into the role of quasi-police services. However, there is no civil equivalent of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (“PACE”) to govern the collection of evidence, treatment of respondents and/or the impact of a breach of those provisions on injunction applications or committal proceedings. Additionally, while many of the individuals charged with investigating ASB complaints are former police officers or experienced housing officers, there is no requirement for them to undergo any form of professional training. In this author’s view, this raises potential issues regarding the civil liberties of respondents to civil injunction applications, particularly in the case of RPs who, unlike local authorities, are private businesses and are not democratically accountable. One method of addressing this would be an expansion of Part 32 CPR to include a range of procedural safeguards akin to PACE.
• A common practical problem that this author and his clients have encountered is the discrepancy between the letter of CPR and practice on the issue of where one is allowed to issue an injunction application. We are aware, of course, that there is only one County Court and that the individual “County Courts” are, in fact, just hearing centres for that court. The problem goes as follows:- CPR state that civil injunction applications can be made at any County Court hearing centre;34 indeed, they specifically state that without notice applications may be made at any County Court hearing centre,35 that the without notice application may be heard at the hearing centre where the application is made,36 and that it may be transferred by the court to the respondent’s home court or another hearing centre as the court considers appropriate.37– In the past, this has opened up the option of issuing and hearing a without notice application at a hearing centre which is not the respondent’s home court because that hearing centre is less busy and/or is easier to get through to on the telephone in order to make an appointment (or perhaps requires no appointments at all), whereupon the matter can then be transferred to the respondent’s home court for the return hearing. No prejudice is caused to the respondent by using this method because this is a without notice application anyway.- However, in practice, court staff in this situation frequently insist that the respondent’s address places the matter “outside of their jurisdiction”, even on occasions when other court staff had already agreed to allow the applicant to issue there; in fact, on one occasion, this author was successful in persuading court staff to permit his client to issue an application in this way, but the judge echoed the “jurisdiction” reasoning and refused to allow him to even enter the courtroom to address them on whether to grant an interim injunction.- This author respectfully suggests that this state of affairs is unsatisfactory as applicants are erroneously denied the opportunity to use a method of swiftly obtaining interim injunctions which is entirely approved by CPR, and without any helpful means of challenging that denial (by the time an appeal or complaint has been dealt with, you may as well have just applied on-notice), with the effect that victims are denied protection; one must remember, of course, that applicants are acting primarily for the benefit of complainants, many of whom are vulnerable.- One method of addressing this would be more training for court staff, and perhaps even judges, on how to deal with without notice applications made in this way.
• It has been known for police officers and local authorities to form a view that, if a perpetrator of ASB is the tenant of an RP, then primary responsibility for dealing with that perpetrator lies with that RP by way of a civil injunction application, and this view is often put to complainants in ASB cases. This view glosses over the fact that the police and local authorities are taxpayer funded organisations responsible for dealing with all ASB that falls within their remit, irrespective of who the perpetrator’s landlord is, and that, for that reason, the police and local authorities have access to further tools that RPs lack. In this author’s experience, this is sometimes due to a lack of training for police and local authority employees that creates misunderstandings about the differences between what they can do and what RPs can do, and this is one area that could be addressed with a view to improving partnership relations and tackling ASB more effectively for all parties. For example:- The police and local authorities38 may apply for closure orders, which are, essentially, orders restricting who may come and go from a property, a breach of which without reasonable excuse is a criminal offence.39– These are typically used when a property is turned into a brothel or used for drug dealing.- While an RP can apply for a civil injunction with a power of arrest in order to achieve similar ends, a key difference is that the making of a closure order prohibiting access for at least 48 hours triggers the mandatory ground for possession automatically,40 whereas a civil injunction must be breached in order for that ground to be triggered. An insistence by the police and/or local authority that an RP must deal with the problem thus prolongs the litigation process as the RP must (1) apply for the injunction and (2) enforce the injunction afterwards.- Those police and local authority employees who are aware of the aforementioned distinctions are often nonetheless under the impression that, because closure order applications have to be made in the Magistrates’ Court, a criminal burden of proof applies, therefore they do not have enough evidence to meet that threshold but an RP in the County Court might. This view is incorrect as closure order applications are subject to a civil burden of proof.41
• The aforementioned training for judges on civil injunction applications should specifically address the appropriateness of attaching a power of arrest to injunctions and the sort of terms to which they should apply. Applicants often take a scattergun approach and ask for a power of arrest to attach to every prohibitive term of the order. This can result in expensive and fruitless satellite litigation as complainants repeatedly call the police for minor breaches that are difficult or even impossible to prove, such as using a swearword, and the parties are therefore dragged into court (literally, in the case of the respondent!) against their wishes. Indeed, the applicant for the injunction may have preferred to have considered the merits of the case before pursuing committal.
• A final matter which training for civil judges may wish to focus on is consistency in the scope of injunction terms themselves. In this author’s experience, some judges insist that general clauses prohibiting nuisance and annoyance and harassment, alarm and distress must be included, whereas others insist that such clauses are too wide and that the terms should, instead, be narrow in scope and focused on dealing with the specific acts of ASB complained of.

Conclusion

Practitioners should listen out for further developments as the aforementioned stakeholders digest the CJC’s recommendations.

All views are my own.

References:
1 – This definition is itself an amalgamation of the various definitions of anti‐social behaviour that appeared in the legislation that preceded the 2014 Act.
2 – R v Manchester Crown Court and another, ex parte McCann and another [2001] 1 WLR 1084.
3 – Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Section 1(10).
4 – Moat Housing Group‐South Limited v Harris and Hartless [2005] EWCA Civ 287.
5 – Housing Act 1988, Schedule 2, grounds 12‐14. 6 Ibid., Section 7.
7  -Ibid., Section 9.
8 – The report, page 8, paragraph 19.
9 – The 2014 Act., Section 1.
10 – Ibid., Section 1((8)(a);
11 – Ibid., Section 1(8)
12 – Ibid., Section 5(1).
13 – Ibid., Section 2(2).
14 – Ibid., Section 16.
15 – Ibid., Section 1(4)(b).
16 – Housing Act 1988, Schedule 2, Ground 7A.
17 – Aster Communities Limited v Akerman‐Livingstone [2015] UKSC 15.
18 – The report, page 11.
19 – The report, page 112.
20 – Contempt of Court Act 1981, Section 14.
21 – Crystalmews Limited v Metterick [2006] EWHC 3087.
22 – Hale v Tanner [2000] 1 WLR 2377.
23 – The report, page 109.
24 – The report, page 85.
25 – Amicus Horizon v Thorley [2012] EWCA Civ 817.
26 – The report, page 121‐122.
27 – The report, page 12.
28 – The report, page 14.
29 – See Wookey v Wookey [1991] Fam 121.
30 – The report, page 86.
31 – The report, page 18.
32 – The 2014 Act, Section 5(3).
33 – Swindon Borough Council v Redpath [2009] EWCA Civ 943.
34 – CPR, Rule 65.43(2)(b).
35 – CPR, Rule 65.43(4)(a1)(i).
36 – CPR, Rule 65.43(4)(a1)(ii).
37 – CPR, Rule 65.43(a1)(iii).
38 – The 2014 Act, Section 80(2).
39 – Ibid., Section 86.
40 – Ibid., Schedule 2, Ground 7A.
41 – [2006] EWHC 1106 (Admin).